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Dual Agency: Corporate Boards with Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] This paper studies reciprocal interlocks of boards of directors of large firms where an employee 
of firm A sits on firm B's board and at the same time an employee of firm B sits on firm A's board. The 
study of Boards of Directors by those in economics and finance is not new. In fact, Dooley (1969) writes 
of interlocking directorates, but his definition is different in that he presents evidence of interlock where 
"at least one director ... sat on the board of at least one other of the largest companies". Books by 
Mizruchi (1982) and Pennings (1980) as well as many articles, for example Bearden and Mintz (1985), 
Bunting and Barbour (1971) and Mintz and Schwartz (1981) discuss interlocking boards in much more 
detail from a sociological perspective. Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) study the longitudinal formation of 
interlocking directorates using a small sample of firms. 
This paper uses data from the early 1990s to explore reciprocal interlocks and the effects they have on 
firms. There are several goals, including documenting the frequency of interlocks and the characteristics 
of boards that interlock, exploring several different definitions of reciprocal interlock, examining whether 
interlocks are symptomatic of agency problems, and whether interlocks have an effect on managerial pay. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies reciprocal interlocks of boards of directors of large firms 
where an employee of firm A sits on firm B's board and at the same time an 
employee of firm B sits on firm A's board. The study of Boards of Directors by 
those in economics and finance is not new. In fact, Dooley (1969) writes of 
interlocking directorates, but his definition is different in that he presents 
evidence of interlock where "at least one director ... sat on the board of at least 
one other of the largest companies". Books by Mizruchi (1982) and Pennings 
(1980) as well as many articles, for example Bearden and Mintz (1985), Bunting 
and Barbour (1971) and Mintz and Schwartz (1981) discuss interlocking 
boards in much more detail from a sociological perspective. Mizruchi and 
Stearns (1988) study the longitudinal formation of interlocking directorates 
using a small sample of firms. 
This paper uses data from the early 1990s to explore reciprocal interlocks 
and the effects they have on firms. There are several goals, including document-
ing the frequency of interlocks and the characteristics of boards that interlock, 
exploring several different definitions of reciprocal interlock, examining 
whether interlocks are symptomatic of agency problems, and whether inter-
locks have an effect on managerial pay.1 
INTERLOCK TYPES AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
The sample frame used in the paper is firms listed in the Forbes magazine 500s 
list which is a list of the 500 largest firms in each of four categories, sales, 
profits, assets, and market value, in 1992; 773 unique firms made the list in that 
year. Icollected detailed information on the boards of directors for each of the 
firms in the sample from annual and proxy reports. Table 1 is an example of the 
kind of data collected for one of the firms, Merck & Company. For each 
director I collected the name, occupation, principal employer, and whether the 
person was retired from his or her main job. The entire data set includes 9,804 
Table 1. Example of Director Data for Merck &.Company, 19921 
Firm 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Merck 
Last 
Atwater 
Birkin 
Bossidy 
Bowen 
Davis 
Elam 
Exley 
Horan 
Kelley 
Markham 
Merck 
Mettler 
Ross 
Vagelos 
Weatherstone 
First 
H 
Derek 
Lawrence 
William 
Carolyne 
Lloyd 
Charles 
John 
William 
Richard 
Albert 
Ruben 
Richard 
P 
Dennis 
Middle 
Brewster 
A 
G 
K 
C 
E 
J 
N 
J 
W 
F 
S 
Roy 
Occupation 
CH-CEO 
CH 
CH-CEO 
PR 
Consultant 
Professor 
CH-CEO 
CH-CEO 
CEO 
PR-COO 
Trustee 
' CH-CEO 
Dean 
CH-CEO 
CH 
Employer 
General Mills 
RTZ 
Allied Signal 
Andrew W Mellon 
' Self 
Meharry Medical 
NCR 
Merck 
University of Pennsylvania Medical Center 
Merck 
Merck Family Trusts 
TRW 
• Johns Hopkins University 
Merck 
JP Morgan & Company 
Retired 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
"For each director and for all firms, the data include the last name, the first name, the middle name, the principal occupation, the principal employer, and 
whether or not the individual is retired from his or her main occupation. Retired = 1 if the individual is retired from his or her main occupation, 0 otherwise. The 
entire director.data set includes 772 other tables that are set up precisely like this one. 
Number of Directors 
E3Complete Sample, 773 Firms BSub - Sample, 602 Firms 
Figure 1. Distribution of number of directors per firm 
director seats held by 7,519 individuals." Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 
number of directors per board. The average is 13 and it is clear from the figure 
that most boards in this sample have between 9 and 15 members. 
It was important to collect information on all firms, as if one of the sample 
firms was excluded then remaining firms may actually look not interlocked 
when, in fact, they were. In some cases, therefore, I needed to supplement the 
data with additional information from other sources such as The Million Dollar 
Directory, Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives, 
The Directory of Corporate Affiliations, Who's Who in Finance and Industry, 
Lexis-Nexis, and Laser Disclosure. 
The first interlock type is what I call current-CEO interlock. Firms A and B 
are current-CEO interlocked if the current CEO from firm A is a member of 
firm B's board and the current CEO from firm B is a member of firm A's board. 
Figure 2 is a histogram of the fraction interlocked by interlock type. There are 
two bars for each type of interlock (others explained below), representing the 
entire sample of 773 firms, and the subsample (n = 602) which contains all 
additional data used elsewhere in the paper for each firm. About 8% of the 
firms are current-CEO interlocked. 
Second, firms A and B are current-employee interlocked if any current 
employee of firm A (including the CEO) serves as a director of firm B and if 
any current employee of firm B (including the CEO) serves as a director of firm 
A. About 12% of firms are current-employee interlocked. 
The third and fourth measures of interlocking only consider individuals who 
have retired from their main jobs. Retired individuals are not as likely to have 
2
 There are fewer individuals than seats as some individuals serve on more than one board. 
current- current reared- retired- any-CEO . any-
CEO employee CEO . employee employee 
interlock type 
Figure 2. Fraction interlocked by interlock type 
such direct input in a reciprocal arrangement. However, since they were 
employees of the firms in question they may have participated in a stronger 
form of interlock prior to becoming retired. Retired-CEO'interlock occurs 
between firms A and B when a retired CEO of firm A serves as a director of 
firm B and a retired CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Firms A and 
B are retired-employee interlocked when any retired employee (including 
. retired CEOs) of firm A serves as a director of firm B and any retired employee 
(including retired CEOs) of firm B serves as a director of firm A. The fraction 
interlocked for these two groups are not' significantly different using these 
measures relative to those interlocked via current employees. 
The fifth measure of interlock is any-CEO interlock. Firms A and B are any-
CEO interlocked when a current or retired CEO of firm A serves as a director 
of firm B and a current or retired CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. 
Of course each firm that is current-CEO interlocked or that is retired-CEO 
interlocked is also any-CEO interlocked, but some firms that are neither 
current-CEO interlocked nor retired-CEO interlocked may be any-CEO inter-
locked. This occurs, for example, when the current CEO of firm A sits on-firm 
B's board and a retired CEO of firm B sits on firm A's board. Any-CEO 
interlock occurs in about 12% of firms.3 
Any-employee interlock is the sixth and most comprehensive interlock 
measure. Two firms are any-employee interlocked if any current or retired 
employee of firm A serves as a director of firm B and vice versa. Any firm that 
is current-employee interlocked or that is retired-employee interlocked must be 
any-employee interlocked but additional firms can be also. This occurs, for 
example, when the current Vice President of firm A serves on firm B's board 
and the retired Treasurer of firm B serves on firm A's board. Roughly 20% of 
firms are any-employee interlocked. 
3
 The sum of the fraction of firms current-CEO interlocked and retired-CEO interlocked can be 
greater than the fraction any-CEO interlocked since some firms can be simultaneously current-
CEO interlocked and retired-CEO interlocked. 
Some of the characteristics of the boards are listed in Table 2. The average 
number of directors per firm is 12.71, the average fraction of inside directors is 
0.25, and the average proportion of directors on a given board who are 
principally employed by one of the other large firms is 0.44. The table also 
computes averages for these variables for the any-employee interlocked and 
non any-employee interlocked groups separately. 
Interlocked boards have, on average, more directors, fewer insiders, and are 
more likely to have directors from one of the other sample firms. Table 2 also 
lists the average market value of equity (collected from Compustat) and the 
average stock return (collected from CRSP). Interlocked firms are much larger 
(in terms of market value of equity) than non-interlocked firms' although the 
returns are not significantly different. Finally, Table 2 lists the 12 primary 
occupations for board members and the average fraction for each per board. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Boards and Firms 
Number of directors 
Proportion insiders 
Proportion of directors employed 
by one of original sample firms 
Market value of equity ($millions) 
Stock return" in year t-1 
Proportion of directors per firm who list 
CEO 
Chairman 
President 
Vice chairman 
Vice president 
Professor 
Attorney 
Doctor 
Government official 
Consultant 
Businessman 
Other occupation 
n 
All 
12.71b(0.16) 
0.25b(.01) 
0.44b (0.01) 
4,843b (336) 
0.48 (0.03) 
primary occupation 
0.32b(0.01) 
0.13 (0.004) 
0.16b (0.004) 
0.05 (0.003) 
0.10b(0.01) 
0.04d (0.003) 
0.02c (0.002) 
0.003 (0.0001) 
0.01c (0.001) 
0.02d (0.002) 
0.09" (0.004) 
0.07b (0.004) 
602 
Non 
any-employee 
interlocked 
12.32(0.19) 
0.26 (0.01) 
0.41 (0.01) 
3,783 (324) 
0.49 (0.03) 
as 
0.29 (0.01) 
0.13(0.01) 
0.16(0.01) 
0.05 (0.003) 
0.11(0.005) 
0.03 (0.003) 
0.02 (0.002) 
0.003 (0.001) 
0.007 (0.001) 
0.024 (0.002) 
0.09 (0.01) 
0.08 (0.01) 
479 
Any-employee. 
interlocked 
14.24(0.15) 
0.23 (0.01) 
0.54(0.01) 
8,973 (975) 
0.44 (0.04) 
0.41 (0.01) 
0:i4(0.01) 
0.14(0.01) 
0.06 (0.01) 
0.08 (0.01) 
0.04 (0.004) 
0.01 (0.003) 
0.001 (0.001) 
0.013 (0.002) 
0.016 (0.003) 
0.07(0.01) 
0.03 (0.004) 
123 
"Annual stock return from CRSP in 1991. All other data from 1992. b,c'dMean differences between 
last two columns at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
ARE INTERLOCKS DUE TO AGENCY PROBLEMS? 
Before I examine any effects of interlock on firms, it is important to try to study 
what interlocks really mean. Are interlocks cronyism? Are interlocks represen-
tative of customer/supplier, banking, or other business relationships among 
firms? Are interlocks simply representative of firm ownership? Do interlocked 
firms have lower accounting or stock market returns than non-interlocked 
firms? Do interlocks occur any more frequently than would be expected by 
random chance? 
Are interlocks just random assignment? 
What fraction of firms would be interlocked if directors were randomly 
assigned to board positions? We should not think a priori that this fraction is 
zero. In this section I focus on the broadest measure of interlock, any-employee 
interlock. To test whether the fraction any-employee interlocked is simply an 
artifact of random assignment, I simulate what the true fraction interlocked 
would be under a set of assumptions. First I assume that the actual board sizes 
and populations of directors are exogenous. That is, the directors who are 
currently in my sample are the entire population of potential directors. I further 
assume that for each of the 999 iterations of randomly assigning directors, each 
director position will be reassigned a spot in the sample. Finally, I assume that 
interlocks are allowed within an industry4 as well as across industries. 
The results of the simulations are shown in Table 3. The first row describes 
the data from the complete sample of 773 firms. In those firms there are 9,804 
director seats filled by 7,519 individual directors. The actual fraction any-
employee interlocked is 20%, which is much larger than the 4.4% we would find 
if these directors were assigned to positions randomly. The second row (top 500 
sales) repeats the analysis for the largest 500 firms by sales. In this subsample, a 
larger fraction of the firms are interlocked, 24%. Although there are fewer 
firms in this sample with which to interlock, larger firms are much more likely 
to interlock. Therefore the fraction interlocked in this smaller sample is larger. 
The simulated fraction in this, subsample is also larger, at 8%, but still 
substantially smaller than the actual fraction. The rest of the top panel in Table 
• 3 shows the simulated and actual fraction interlocked for various subsamples 
of the director data. As the sample size is decreased, both the true and 
simulated fraction interlocked tend to increase but the true fraction interlocked 
remains substantially larger than the simulated fraction. 
In light of a comment by Jensen and Murphy (1990) that "disclosure of top-
management compensation can help guard against 'looting' by management 
(in collusion with 'captive' boards of directors)".we might guess that the true 
fraction interlocked might be smaller today than was the case in an earlier 
Technically employees of one firm cannot serve as directors for another firm in the same 
industry according to the Clayton Act of 1914. However, even though there have been potential 
violations of the act, it is very rarely enforced (see Dooley, 1969). 
Table 3. Actual and simulated fraction of interlocking directorships using data from two years" 
Simulated Actual 
fraction any- fraction 
employee- any-employee-
Firms 
Data from 1992 
Top 773 
Top 500 (sales) 
Top 400 (sales) 
Top 300 (sales) 
Top 252 (sales) 
Data from 1976 
Top 252 (sales) 
Seats 
9,804 
6,441 
5,285 
4,048 
3,469 
3,976 
Directors 
7,519 
4,773 
3,912 
3,003 
2,593 
3,108 
interlocked 
0.0435 (0.0003) 
0.0768 (0.0005) 
0.0957 (0.0006) 
0.1178(0.0008) 
0.1386(0.0009) 
0.1431 (0.0009) 
interlocked 
0.2040(0.0146) 
0.2400(0.0191) 
0.2650 (0.0221) 
0.2933 (0.0263) 
0.2857 (0.0285) 
0.0754(0.0167) 
"The first panel uses the data collected from 1992 and the second panel uses data from 1976. In 
Panel A Top 773 represents the entire director sample from 1992. This is all 773 of the Forbes 500s 
firms. Seats are the actual number of board director positions. For all 773 firms there were 9804 
seats. However, since some directors serve on more than one board there were only 7519 unique 
directors in the top 773 firms. To perform the simulations, I assume that (1) directors who are 
currently in my sample are the entire sample of potential directors, (2) each director position has 
probability one of being randomly reassigned a spot in the sample, and (3) interlocks are allowed 
within industry. 999 iterations are performed for each sample. The actual fraction of any-employee 
interlocked firms is reported in the last column. Interlocking appears to happen much more 
frequently than if directors were randomly assigned to boards. Each row in the top panel represents 
a different sample from the data. The bottom panel reports results using the 252 largest firms in 
terms of sales in 1976. This is the size of the sample obtained from Bearden and Mintz (1985). 
(Standard errors are reported in parentheses). 
period, as disclosure has become more common and SEC rules more strict. 
Surprisingly, this is not the case. Although the simulated fraction (if directors 
are assigned randomly) is very similar in 1992 (penultimate row in Table 3) and 
1976 (last row in Table 3; 13.9 vs. 14.3%), the actual fraction is much larger in 
1992 relative to 1976 (28.6 vs. 7.5%).5 This could be the result of measurement 
error in the collection of the data for 1976 but could also be due to the 
increased numbers of joint venture and other business relationship or customer 
supplier relationships among firms over the time period. 
Anti-takeover amendments, poison pills and golden parachutes 
To answer additional questions about agency costs I tried to study whether the 
firms had (1) anti-takeover amendments, (2) golden parachutes or (3) poison 
pills by exploring the annual reports, proxy statements, lOQs, and lOKs for a 
large subset (602) of the original 773 firms in a very simple way.6 A positive 
I thank Beth Mintz and James Bearden for access to their director data set from 1976. 
association between interlock and these phenomena might imply agency 
conflicts. For a given firm, I searched using a computer through the reports 
for the words, anti-takeover, golden parachute, and poison pill. If one of these 
words was detected, I read the text more carefully and a determined whether 
these phenomena actually existed in these firms. 
Table. 4 shows that although the fraction of any-employee interlocked firms 
that have poison pills and anti-takeover amendments is higher than the fraction 
for non-interlocked firms, the difference is not statistically significant. How-
ever, the fraction of any employee interlocked firms that have golden para-
chutes is lower than the fraction of non-interlocked firms (the results are the 
same for the five other measures of interlock). Even if we .were willing to 
assume that poison pills, anti-takeover amendments or golden parachutes were 
symptomatic of agency conflicts (and that this is a good method for finding 
them), the data do not provide strong evidence that interlocked firms are more 
likely to have them. 
Table 4. Fraction of any-employee interlocked firms and non any-employee interlocked firms with 
poison pills, anti-takeover amendments, and golden parachutes8 
Non any-employee Any-employee 
interlocked firms interlocked firms 
(n=479) (n=123) 
Poison pill 3.97% (0.89) 5.69% (2.10) 
Anti-takeover amendment 7.93% (1.24). 9.76% (2.69) 
Golden parachute 3.34% (0.82) 0.81% (0.81) 
"Two firms are any-employee interlocked if any current or retired employee of firm A is a director of 
firm B and vice versa. For these 602 firms a determination was made about whether the firms have 
poison pills, anti-takeover amendments, or golden parachutes by reviewing annuals reports, proxy 
statements, lOKs and lOQs for each firm. (Standard errors are reported in parentheses). 
Customer/supplier, banking and other business relationships 
It may also be the case that interlocks simply reflect other kinds of business 
relationships such as customer/supplier, banking, or other business relation-
ships and that they are not, therefore, cronyism at all. For each interlocked firm 
I studied annual reports, proxy statements, 1 OKs and 1 OQs to study why these 
firms were interlocked. For each firm I again searched with a computer through 
the reports for the name of the firm to which it was interlocked. When the 
computer found the name of the other firm in these reports a determination 
was made as to whether the firms had a customer/supplier, banking, other 
business relationship, or a relationship not explained by one of the other three 
Some firms were excluded since all reports could not be located. 
Table 5. Fraction of any-employee and any-CEO interlocked firms with customer/supplier, bank-
ing, or other business relationships" 
Any-employee interlock Any-CEO interlock 
(n = 123) (n = 75) 
Customer/supplier relationship 13.01% (3.05) 10.67% (3.59) 
Banking relationship 6.50% (2.23) 13.33% (2.28) 
Other business relationship 14.63% (3.20) 13.33% (3.95) 
"Two firms are any-CEO interlocked if a current or retired CEO of firm A serves as a director of 
firm B and a current or retired CEO of firm B is a director of firm A. Two firms are any-employee 
interlocked if any current or retired employee of firm A is a director of firm B and vice versa. I 
studied whether the firms have customer/supplier, banking, or other business relationships by going 
back to annual reports, proxy statements, 1 OKs and 1 OQs for each interlocked firm. For example, if 
firm A was interlocked with firm B, a computer searched through each of firm A's reports looking 
for reference to firm B. When a reference was found, a determination was made about whether these 
relationships were customer/supplier, banking, other business relationships, or none of the others. 
(Standard errors are reported in parentheses) 
categories. Table 5 shows the fraction of interlocked firms whose interlocks are 
relationship-based. For example, two firms that participate in a joint venture 
are considered to have a business relationship. The first column is the fraction 
of any-employee interlocked firms with these relationships. The second column 
is the fraction of any-CEO interlocked firms with these relationships. 
Although this clearly does not account for all interlocks which are due to 
business relationships, a strong case can be made that cronyism is less likely to 
be a problem in the firms with these kinds of arrangements. A number of firms 
seem to be interlocked for business reasons. For example, of any-employee 
interlocked firms, 13% had identifiable customer/supplier relationships, and 
15% had other business relationships. Firms that have at least one customer/ 
supplier, banking, or other business relationship make up 26% of the any-
employee interlocked firms and 22% of the any-CEO interlocked firms (clearly 
some of the firms have more than one of these relationships at once). This 
section seems to lend some evidence against the notion that interlock is just 
cronyism; however, a large fraction of interlocks remain unexplained by 
business relationships. Part of the analysis below on managerial compensation 
(Table 8) separates firms into all interlocked firms and those who are 
interlocked for reasons unexplained by customer/supplier, banking, or other 
business relationships. Although one cannot be certain, it is possible that the 
remaining firms are more likely to have agency costs than the former. 
CEO and officer and director ownership 
I also analysed whether interlock might just mean ownership of the firm. If it 
were the case that firms currently headed by founders or firms whose CEO 
owned larger share holdings (either in terms of proportion of stock owned or 
total value of shares held) or firms whose officers and directors had larger 
ownership interests, were systematically more likely to be interlocked, then the 
interlock variable may mean something other than cronyism and something 
more like ownership over the firm. If the owner and manager are the same, 
there is no agency conflict. To help study this I have collected the percent of 
stock in the firm owned by the chief executive and the fraction owned by 
officers and directors from Forbes. These are included as measures of owner-
ship structure. It may be the case that if a CEO owns more of the stock of the 
firm for which he is employed, his interests are more in line with those of the 
shareholders than otherwise. 
I ran probit models where the dependent variable was any-employee 
interlock (not reported in the tables). Explanatory variables included CEO, 
officer, and director share ownership, an indicator variable for whether the 
CEO is a founder, firm equity value, and stock market return. Various tests 
suggest that CEOs with more control in terms of ownership are not more likely 
to be interlocked. 
Performance 
Do interlocked firms have lower performance than other firms? Lower profits 
or returns for interlocked firms might be suggestive of agency conflicts. 
Although interlocked firms have a lower point estimate of returns, the effects 
are insignificant for each measure of return: stock return (see Table 2), return 
on assets, and return on equity, 
To summarize, there is some reason to believe that interlock is due to agency 
conflicts. First, simulation estimates suggest that interlocking happens far 
more often than can be explained by random chance. Second, although up fo 
26% of interlocks can be explained by customer/supplier, banking, or other 
business relationships, a large proportion of interlocking cannot be. Third, 
more interlocked firms adopt poison pills and anti-takeover amendments than 
non-interlocked firms (although the difference is not statistically significant). 
Fourth, interlocked firms tend to have lower returns (although insignificantly 
so) than non-interlocked firms. Finally, interlock does not seem to be correlated 
with firm ownership. Taken together, these facts suggest that interlock could be 
due to agency problems in corporate governance. 
D U A L AGENCY MODEL AND MANAGERIAL PAY. 
Theories of managerial compensation and background 
In the extensive literature on executive compensation, two theories, pay for 
productivity (Murphy, 1985) and tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), have 
received the most attention. However, neither of these directly examines the 
role of the body which sets executive pay - the board of directors. The pay for 
productivity literature is characterized in a paper by Murphy (1985). The basic 
building block of most pay for productivity models, especially in regard to 
CEO pay, is the principal-agent relationship. The principal (the shareholders or 
owners of the firm) cannot perfectly observe the actions of the agent (the CEO). 
In order to motivate an executive, the employer can use a measure of the CEO's 
performance, such as the stock market return, paying him more if the measure 
is high and less if it is low. 
The typical approach in testing pay for productivity models is to regress the 
natural logarithm of compensation on a set of CEO and firm characteristics, 
often taken from panel data. Standard firm control variables include firm size 
in terms of stock market value or sales. The important explanatory variable in 
the productivity model is firm performance, measured for example, by the 
stock market return of the firm.7 If a positive relationship exists between stock 
market return and CEO pa}', then it is argued the CEOs are doing well for the 
firm. 
Finally, the modern tournament literature was started by Lazear and Rosen 
(1981). The basis of this literature is the idea that firm compensation should be 
interpreted as a prize for superior job performance. The ultimate prize in a 
given firm is the job of CEO, whose salary is typically the highest in the firm. 
This is not because he is worth that much, but rather that this higher salary 
offers incentives to the others in the firm to work harder in competition for the 
prize. If a firm offers a wage that is, say, twice the CEO's marginal product, this 
still may be efficient for the employer since one should take into consideration 
not only the marginal product of the CEO but also the marginal products of the 
other managers in the firm who might have a chance of one day becoming 
CEO.8 
Dual agency 
Existing models describe managerial compensation quite well but they ignore 
an important ingredient of the make-up of compensation for CEOs. The 
composition of the. Board of Directors, which ultimately votes on a given 
CEO's compensation, may yield additional information in helping to describe 
salaries of CEOs.9 
Many of the CEOs of large firms are directors of other large firms. If a CEO 
7
 Two of the most influential papers in this literature are Murphy (1985) and Jensen and Murphy 
(1990). Other papers include Baker el al. (1988), Bizjak el al. (1993), Ciscel (1974), Ciscel and 
Carroll (1980), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), DiNardo el at. (1997), Ehrenberg and Milkovich 
(1987), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Hallock (1997, 1998), Hallock and Oyer (1997), Lambert 
and Larker (1988), Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Masson (1971), Murphy (1986), Roberts 
(1956) and Sloan (1993). Hall and Liebman (1997) provide an interesting new look at these 
issues. 
8
 Related work includes Baker el al. (1993), Leonard (1990) and O'Reilly el al. (1988). 
9
 If it were true that directors acted exactly in the interests of shareholders, then we would not 
have to explicitly account for board structure. 
of firm 1 is on the Board of Directors of firm 2 and if a CEO of firm 2 is on the 
Board of Directors of firm 1, then the CEOs may have unusual opportunities to 
increase each other's salaries. I refer to this situation (above) as current-CEO 
interlock. Additionally, many non-CEO employees of firms in the sample serve 
as directors of other firms in the sample. These non-CEO employees are 
important for two reasons. The first is that they may someday become CEOs 
themselves. Second, CEO compensation appears to be linked with the 
compensation of other top managers (see Arreglado, 1993). 
The basic hypothesis that reciprocal interlock can lead to higher salaries for 
both CEOs can be formalized by thinking of a simple model in which each 
board has only one director. In the absence of interlock, the CEO of firm 1 is 
an agent for the owners of the firm represented by the board. Standard 
principal-agent models (e.g., Fama, 1980; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; 
Holmstrom, 1979; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggest that the board will try 
to design a compensation package to maximize the value of the firm, after 
paying the CEO. Suppose now that CEOl is the director of firm 2 and CE02 is 
the director of firm 1. Then these two CEOs could be thought of as a pair of 
agents who ideally have to negotiate with the collective set of owners of firm 1 
and firm 2. If the compensation of CEOl is left in the hands of CE02 and vice 
versa, it is difficult to imagine that their salaries will be set at the optimal levels 
from the perspective of the firms. Thus, the name dual agency. Interlocking 
directorates can potentially threaten the board's ability to objectively set 
salaries on behalf of the firm's owners. Bowen (1994) suggests, for example, 
that "[in] selecting board members, care should be taken to avoid incestuous 
relationships and to preserve a certain amount of distance between board 
members and the CEO". It remains an empirical issue whether reciprocally 
interlocking directorates pose any serious problems. 
There are other board member to CEO relationships which are not explored 
here. Consultants and representatives of law firms often sit on boards of 
directors. It might be difficult for these types of directors to deny large pay 
increases to CEOs given that the CEO may single-handedly have full authority 
to relieve them (or their firms) from their services. 
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION - DO INTERLOCKS MATTER? 
"The very high salaries we observe in many American corporations may not be optimal prizes, but 
simply a way in which corporate directors distribute rents to their friends in the executive suite. This 
suspicion is reinforced by the frequency with which the CEOs of one corporation serve as directors 
of another." - Rees (1992) 
Background 
An earlier study by Williamson (1963) suggests a relationship between the 
compensation of the top executive and other variables, including 'composition 
of the board'. Controlling for administrative, general, and selling expenses (i.e., 
staff) of the firm, the concentration ratio in the industry, and the height of 
barriers to entry in the firm's industry, he finds that the proportion of the board 
represented by inside managers (those who are principally employed by the 
firm for which they serve as director) has an insignificantly positive effect on 
CEO compensation.10 
Work by Weisbach (1988) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) also looks at 
inside vs. outside directors in relation to CEO turnover, which can be thought 
of as a crude measure of compensation.11 Weisbach concludes "There is a 
stronger association between prior performance and the probability of resigna-
tion for companies with outsider-dominated boards than for companies with 
insider-dominated boards". Hermalin and Weisbach write that "When their 
CEO nears retirement, firms tend to add inside directors (and) just after a CEO 
change, inside directors with short tenures appear more likely to leave the 
board". They also found that inside directors are more likely to leave a board 
after a firm performs poorly and when a firm exits a market, and outside 
directors are more likely to join.12 
A group of authors has begun studying the differences among three theories: 
'social comparison', economic and psychological. O'Reilly et al. (1988), using a 
sample of 105 firms, found a "strong association between CEO compensation 
and the compensation of outside members of the board of directors", even 
when controlling for return on assets, sales, and assets. Belliveau et al. (1996) 
used a sample of 61 firms and concluded that "social similarity and status 
differences significantly increase CEO compensation after controlling for 
variables representing economic, social comparison, and other social influence 
explanations for CEO compensation". Main et al. (1995) also studied whether 
the CEO's social influence over the board can yield higher CEO pay. They 
found, for example, that CEOs appointed before the chairs of their compensa-
tion committees received 11% more pay than CEOs appointed after their 
compensation committee chairs. Finally, Newman and Wright (1995) found, 
in a sample of 161 firms, that CEOs who have at least one insider on their 
compensation committees have higher compensation. 
10
 Other authors such as Mayers and Smith (1992) also consider the relative fraction ofinsiders to 
outsiders (also see Rediker and Seth, 1995). 
1
' Dismissal is a form of very low compensation. 
12
 Kaplan and Minton (1994) investigated the appointments of outside directors to boards in 
Japan and the USA. They found that turnover of Japanese executives was higher in the years 
where outside directors employed by banks or other nonfinancial companies are added to 
boards. They conclude that "banks and corporate shareholders play an important monitoring 
and disciplinary role in Japan." Kaplan (1994) found that in Germany, where there are both 
supervisory and management boards, board turnover increases with poor stock performance. 
Yermack (1996) provides an interesting examination and shows an "inverse association between 
board size and firm value." 
Returns to interlock 
This section is aimed at three issues. First, do CEOs who lead interlocked firms 
earn more? Second, does the 'return' to interlock vary by definition of interlock 
(from, for example, considering current CEOs vs. retired CEOs)? Third, does 
redefining those interlocked firms that have documented customer/supplier, 
banking, or other business relationships as not interlocked affect the return to 
interlock? 
The 1992 data on CEO compensation and characteristics are from Forbes 
magazine's annual compensation survey. There are three primary measures of 
pay: (1) salary plus bonus, (2) salary plus bonus plus other (which includes such 
items as the value of contributions to savings plans and memberships to clubs) 
and (3) total compensation (which is the sum of (2) plus exercised options).13 
Forbes also reports information on the CEO's age, seniority as CEO and 
seniority with the firm, as well as other variables. 
Table 6 displays means of the variables on CEOs for any-employee and non 
any-employee interlocked firms separately. The CEOs earned between $1.1 and 
$2.6 million depending on how pay was measured. The average age of the 
CEOs was 57, the average seniority in the firm was 24 years and the average 
seniority as CEO was 9 years. Interlocked CEOs earned more, were older, and 
had been CEO for fewer years than CEOs who were not interlocked. 
Table 7 begins to answer the first of the three questions posed at the 
beginning of this section.14 The last three columns in Table 7 show raw wage 
differentials for the three measures of pay. For example, curreht-CEO inter-
locked firms pay their CEOs an average of 32.63% more than non-current-
CEO interlocked firms. For the first two measures of pay, it is clear from the 
tables that CEOs heading interlocked firms earn substantially more than CEOs 
who are not. This is not universally true, however, for the third measure of pay 
(total compensation), but as I stated earlier, this is an unusual way to measure 
pay. However, as we have seen in Table 2, interlocked firms have several easily 
observed characteristics (for example market value of equity is much higher in 
interlocked firms) that are much different from non-interlocked firms. Perhaps 
interlock picks up these other variables. 
Table 8 presents coefficients on interlock indicator variables from least 
squares regressions of compensation on interlock and control variables such 
as the CEO's age and its square, the CEO's seniority in the firm and its square, 
the CEO's seniority as CEO and its square, the ln(firm market value of equity), 
lagged stock return, the number of directors and 20 industry indicator 
variables. The six columns have two columns each for ln(salary plus bonus), 
Note that this includes the value of options when exercised, not when granted, so this variable 
clearly has noise associated with it. A better variable would be (2) plus the current value of 
options granted in a given year. Recent rule changes by the SEC have made collecting the value 
of options granted in a given year much easier. 
14
 See Hallock (1997) for additional explanation of the interlock effect on executive compensa-
tion.. 
Table 6. Summary Statistics For CEOs" 
CEO's age (years) 
CEO's firm seniority (years) 
CEO's seniority as CEO (years) 
CEO's salary plus bonus (Smillions) 
CEO's salary + bonus + other (Smillions) 
CEO's total compensation (Smillons) 
n 
All 
56.98b (0.27) 
23.72b (0.49) 
8.52b(0.31) 
1.10b(0.04) 
1.35b(0.05) 
2.57 (0.23) 
602 
Non-
any-employee 
interlocked 
56.75 (0.32) 
22.62 (0.56) 
8.87 (0.36) 
1.05(0.05) 
1.28(0.06) 
2.45 (0.23) 
479 
Any-employee 
interlocked 
57.88 (0.43) 
28.02(0.87) 
7.17(0.28) 
1.27(0.06) 
1.64(0.08) 
3.05 (0.63) 
123 
"Summary statistics are presented for all, for non any-employee interlocked firms, and for any-
employee interlocked firms. Two firms are any-employee interlocked if any current or retired 
employee (including CEOs) of firm A serves as a director of firm B and if any current or retired 
employee (including CEOs) of firm B serves as a director of firm A. The measures of compensation 
are (salary plus bonus), (salary plus bonus plus other compensation), and (total compensation). 
Other compensation includes such items as insurance policies, restricted shares that vested during 
the year, savings plan contributions, memberships to clubs, etc. Total compensation is the sum of 
salary plus bonus plus other compensation plus exercised options. These compensation data are 
from Forbes magazine and are for 1992. 
bMean differences between the last two columns at 0.01 level of significance. Standard deviations 
are in parentheses. 
ln(salary plus bonus plus other),, and ln(total compensation) as the dependent 
variable, respectively. The rows represent which interlock type is controlled for. 
Only the return to interlock coefficients and their standard errors are displayed 
in Table 8. Each set of two numbers in the table represents a different 
regression. 
Columns 1, 3, and 5 use the six standard interlocking definitions defined 
above. The returns to interlock seem to vary somewhat by measure of 
compensation. The returns to interlock using ln(salary plus bonus), and 
ln(salary plus bonus plus other) are always positive and in one case large and 
statistically significant. The returns to interlock using ln(total compensation) 
are never significant and sometimes even negative. This is not particularly 
surprising given the discussion above that this is a poor measure of compensa-
tion. Although the measures vary somewhat, it is puzzling that the return to 
current-CEO interlock is smaller than the return to current employee interlock 
and that the retired interlock return measures are typically the same or only 
slightly smaller than the current ones. Clearly, controlling for the additional 
covariates has a significant effect on the large positive returns to interlock 
imphed by Table 7. 
Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 8 help to answer the third question: 'does 
redefining those interlocked firms that have documented customer/supplier, 
Table 7. Interlocked vs non-interlocked percentage compensation differentials for various measures 
of interlocking and three measures of compensation" 
Interlock type 
1. Current-CEO 
2. Current-employee 
3. Retired-CEO 
4. Retired-employee 
5. Any-CEO 
6. Any-employee 
Fraction • 
interlocked 
7.48 
11.46 
5.65 
11.46 
12.45 
20.43 
((Intel 
Salary 
phis bonus 
32.63c 
27.78c 
20.36 
19.83d 
29.79c 
21.05c 
•locked pay) - (Non-interlocked pay) ) 
(Non-interlocked pay) 
Salary plus 
bonus plus other 
29.29c 
20.21b 
18.42 
25.52c 
26.88c 
28.20b 
Total 
compensation 
63.79d 
36.22 
-15.76 
17.42 
34.27 
24.65 
"The first measure of interlock is 1. current-CEO interlock. Two firms are current-CEO interlocked 
if a current CEO from firm A sits on the board of firm B and a current CEO of firm B sits on the 
board of firm A. The other measures of interlock are also reciprocal arrangements but for different 
subsets of employees: 2. current-employee includes any current employees (including the CEOs), 3. 
retired-CEO only includes retired CEOs, 4. retired-employee includes any retired individuals 
including the CEOs, 5. any-CEO includes current or retired CEOs, and 6. any-employee is the' 
most comprehensive measure and includes any current or retired employees including CEOs. The 
measures of compensation are (salary plus bonus), (salary plus bonus plus other compensation), 
and (total compensation). Other compensation includes such items as insurance policies, restricted 
shares that vested during the year, savings plan contributions, memberships in clubs etc. Total 
compensation is the sum of salary plus bonus plus other compensation plus exercised options. 
These compensation data are from Forbes magazine and are for 1992. This analysis is for the 
sample that includes complete data on board structure as well as complete data on compensation 
and other CEO and firm characteristics (n = 602). The interlocked fractions in the first column are 
basically .the same if the entire board data are used. Asterisks represent statistically significant 
difference between mean compensation of interlocked and non-interlocked CEOs for given 
compensation and interlock measures at the 0.01(b), 0.05(c), and 0.10(d) levels. 
banking, or other business relationships as not interlocked have an effect on the 
return to interlock' and also offers interesting and more plausible insight into 
the returns to the different measures of interlock. These columns present the 
results from three sets of linear regressions (for each of three independent 
variables), with the same independent variables as in columns 1,3, and 5 except 
that firms are defined as not interlocked if they have documented customer/ 
supplier, banking, or other business relationships. 
Redefining interlock in this way leaves only those firms with potentially the 
largest opportunity for agency problems. If the dual agency idea is correct, 
then this ought to yield higher returns to interlock. In all but one case, for the 
first two measures of compensation, the point estimate for the return to 
interlock is higher when firms with business relationships are considered to be 
not interlocked. It is also interesting to note that when interlocks are redefined 
Table 8. Estimates of the return to interlock using several measures of interlock3 
ln(salary+bonus) ln(salary+bonus+other) In (total compensation) 
Interlock type 
1. Current-CEO 
2. Current-employee 
3. Retired-CEO 
4. Retired-employee 
5. Any-CEO 
6. Any-employee 
Standard 
interlock 
definition 
(1) 
0.068 (0.793) 
0.096 (1.356) 
0.079 (0.812) 
0.078 (1.090) 
0.089 (1.282) 
0.092(1.583) 
Business 
relationships 
considered not 
interlocked 
(2) 
0.158(1.528) 
0.159(1.794) 
0.104(1.026) 
0.076 (0.982) 
0.139° (1.823) 
0.116C (1.805) 
Standard 
interlock 
definition 
(S) 
0.039(0.413) 
0.119(1.523) 
0.042(0.392) 
0.109(1.381) 
0.054 (0.700) 
0.142b (2.204) 
Business 
relationships 
considered not 
interlocked 
(4) ' 
0.130(1.134) 
0.174c (1.764) 
0.065 (0.574) 
0.111(1.297) 
0.104(1.235) 
0.166b (2.309) 
Standard 
interlock 
definition 
(5) 
0.004 (0.032) 
0.014(0.126) 
-0.047(0.317) 
0.085 (0.767) 
0.007 (0.065) 
0.060 (0.665) 
Business 
relationships 
considered 
not interlocked 
(6) 
-0.028(0.177) 
-0.034 (0.247) 
-0.004 (0.026) 
0.070 (0.590) 
-0.010(0.087) 
0.045 (0.448) 
"The dependent variables in each column are, respectively, ln(salary plus bonus), ln(salary plus bonus plus other compensation) and ln(total compensation). 
Other compensation includes such items as insurance policies, restricted shares that vested during the year, savings plan contributions, memberships in clubs, 
etc. Total compensation is the sum of salary plus bonus plus other compensation plus exercised options. These salary data are from Forbes magazine and are for 
1992. All specifications also control for 20 industry indicator variables, age of the CEO and its square, seniority of the CEO in the firm and its square, seniority 
of the CEO as CEO and its square, ln(firm value), stock return in 1991, and the number of directors on the board. The first measure of interlock is 1. current-
CEO interlock. Two firms are current-CEO interlocked if a current CEO from firm A sits on the board of firm B and the current CEO of firm B sits on the board 
of firm A. The other measures of interlock are also reciprocal arrangements but for different subsets of employees: 2. current-employee includes any current 
employees (including the CEOs), 3. retired-CEO only includes retired CEOs, 4. retired-employee includes any retired individuals including the CEOs, 5. any-
CEO includes current or retired CEOs, and 6. any-employee is the most comprehensive measure and includes any current or retired employees including CEOs. 
This is the subset of data for which information is available on customer/supplier, banking, and other business relationships. b = significant at 0.05, 
c = significant at 0.10. There are 602 observations, (t-statistics are in parentheses). 
in this way (for the first two dependent variables) the CEO interlock coefficients 
are higher relative to the employee interlock coefficients than before, and the 
current interlock coefficients are higher relative to the retired than before. This 
is consistent with the dual agency hypothesis. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This chapter empirically studies corporate boards with reciprocal interlocking 
relationships and has several findings. First, it documents that there is a 
substantial amount of board interlocking. For example, roughly 20% of all 
boards are in situations where at least one current or retired employee of firm A 
is on the board of firm B and vice versa. The paper also shows that there is a 
significant amount of interlocking among current and even retired employees, 
although this is not as frequent as 20%. 
The paper also shows that board interlocks may be due to agency problems 
in firms although the evidence certainly is not conclusive. The results of the 
simulations using the 1992 data suggest that interlock does not happen by 
chance. Directors interlock much more often than they would have had they 
been assigned randomly to board positions. This, however, is only a necessary 
condition for cronyism by directors and is not sufficient evidence to imply that 
directors are acting against the interests of shareholders. There seems to be 
other evidence that interlock may lead to agency conflicts. Although the 
difference is not significant, the fraction of interlocked firms to adopt poison 
pills and anti-takeover amendments is higher than the fraction of non-
interlocked firms. It is~also' true that although several of the interlocks can be 
explained by business relationships, a substantial fraction remain unexplained. 
Also, interlock cannot be explained by management ownership. Other evidence 
in favor of the 'cronyism' hypothesis exists. Agrawal and Walkling (1994) 
suggest that takeover bids are more likely to occur in industries where CEOs 
have positive abnormal compensation, suggesting perhaps that new manage-
ment can run the firm more efficiently. Also there is some evidence that the 
return to interlock is falling over time (Hallock (1997) shows that the return to 
interlock was significantly higher in .1976 than in 1992) which might suggest 
that recent attempts to open-up the process of executive salary determination 
are helping to curb cronyism. 
Directors, on the other hand, may serve on each other's boards simply 
because they are known by one another to be of high quality. In fact, 
controlling for additional unobservables of CEOs that may be correlated with 
management ability suggests this may be true (see Hallock, 1997). In addition, 
if it were the case that interlock really did mean that CEOs, in collusion with 
directors, were extracting rents from the firm, then we might expect lower 
profits and returns from interlocked firms. This is not the case. 
Finally, previous study of the compensation of Chief Executive Officers has 
excluded detailed analysis of the group which actually sets CEO pay, the board 
of directors. This work uses the sample of the composition of the boards of 
directors of America's largest firms as well as information on CEO compensa-
tion and firm characteristics for a number of years to test the hypothesis that 
CEOs who are reciprocally interlocked with other CEOs via their boards of 
directors can raise their wages above those of their counterparts who are not 
interlocked. It demonstrates that interlocked CEOs earn, on average, signifi-
cantly higher wages than non-interlocked CEOs. After controlling for firm and 
CEO characteristics, this pay gap is reduced dramatically. However, when 
considering only those types of interlocks which are most likely to be 
symptomatic of agency problems, there does appear to be some evidence of a 
positive return to CEO pay for CEOs who interlock. 
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